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In this interesting and somewhat unique article, four members
of the bench and bar exchange their thoughts on the subject of voir
dire. In general, the participants consider abuses which have crept
into the present voir dire procedure and discuss ways in which these
abuses can be curbed, focusing in particularupon the role of education
as a method for corrective change as against developing new state
and federal procedural rules.
INTRODUCTION

In a prize-winning article entitled "The Case of the Rebellious
Juror," Mr. Robert F. Maxwell brings to light some of the current
problems which exist with respect to the practice of voir dire. Using
the context of a hypothetical case brought before the United States
Supreme Court in 1979, Mr. Maxwell's article-which constitutes
the opinion of the Court - examines these problems and suggests ways
in which they can be resolved.
When this article came to the attention of the Denver Law
journal, the Journal Association thought that the issues raised by Mr.
Maxwell and the solutions which he suggested would lend themselves
to an interesting discussion. Therefore, the Journalcontacted four very
respected members of the bench and bar and conducted a conversation
via telephone conference call on the subject of voir dire, using Mr.
Maxwell's article as a basis for discussion.
In order to give the reader some necessary background for the
edited conversation which follows, the Journal has condensed Mr.
Maxwell's essay. The following material is the core of that article
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Bar Association; Member, House of Delegates, American Bar Association; appointed to
federal bench in 1964; B.A. 1931, LL.B. 1934, Stanford University.
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(petroleum engineer); LL.B. 1950, University of Virginia.
tAttorney, Executive Director, Institute for Court Management, University of Denver Law
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and includes the specific portions to which the discussion participants
addressed themselves:
The Case of the Rebellious Juror1
LESTER WAITHCOMBE, Petitioner,
V.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

No. 515 Argued October 15, 1979-

Decided December 10, 1979.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, a professor of political science at a community college,
was called as a juror in a state court prosecution for inciting to riot.
The defendants were students at a university in a distant section of
the state, a change of venue having been granted. On voir dire the
petitioner was asked a series of questions concerning his and his wife's
political activities. He refused to answer these questions on the grounds
that they violated his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. The judge excused him from serving on the jury, but
held him in contempt and sentenced him to thirty days imprisonment.
After exhausting his state remedies, he petitioned the United
States District Court for a writ of habeas corpus. That court denied
his petition on the ground that no constitutional rights had been violated. In its opinion, the court stated that the trial judge had not
abused his discretion in allowing an extended voir dire on points
which could possibly justify a challenge for cause and would certainly
elicit information which might make a peremptory challenge advisable.
In support of his appeal to the court of appeals, petitioner contended
that his case came within the protective doctrines of Sweezy v. New
Hampshire2 and N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama." The court of appeals agreed
with petitioner as to the holdings of these two cases yet decided the
case adversely to him. The court quoted the language of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Sweezy: "For a citizen to be made to forgo even a part
of so basic a liberty as his political autonomy" (i.e., the revelation of
1 This article, originally published in full in the September 1970 issue of the AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, won the 1970 Ross Essay contest that is conducted annually

by the American Bar Association. Appreciation is extended to the American Bar Association for permission to reprint portions of this article. It should be noted that the citations,
which appeared in the text of the article as originally printed, have been made into
footnotes and run consecutively with the footnotes added to the comments of the discussion participants.
2354 U.S. 234 (1957).

3 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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his political beliefs and associations), "the subordinating interest of
the State must be compelling. ' 4 The court of appeals held that the
interest of the state in securing an impartial jury was "compelling"
and that the disputed voir dire was essential in obtaining such a jury.
We granted certiorari not only because of the fine line between
the right to an impartial jury and the right of privacy vouchsafed to
the petitioner by the Constitution, but also because of the serious
problems concerning the propriety and value of voir dire, which have
become ever more pressing in our complex and fast moving society.
Originally, voir dire was principally the concern of federal and
state judges at the nisi prius level. It was our problem solely in the
exercise of our general supervisory responsibilities over the operations
of the federal court system.
Events, however, forced us to consider the adequacy of voir dire
in numerous state cases where substantial prejudicial publicity occurred.
Our general conclusion was that voir dire is a completely inefficacious
protection when such publicity exists.'
In three cases decided within a 2-week span in the spring of 1968,
however, we crossed the great divide between state and federal responsibility in regard to jury trials. In Duncan v. Louisiana,' the Court held
that "the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all
criminal cases which - were they to be tried in a federal court - would
come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee."' It is true, of course,
that this decision applies only to criminal trials. It proved, however,
to be extremely difficult, in fact, impossible, to uphold the argument
of the Court in Duncan, applying the criminal jury trial requirements
of the Sixth Amendment to the states, and to deny that argument efficacy in incorporating the civil jury requirements of the Seventh. Thus,
the extension of federal constitutional guarantees to jury trial, together
with the concomitant responsibilities and powers of this Court, has
been applied by this Court not only to criminal but to civil matters.
The caveat by Mr. Justice Fortas in Bloom v. Illinois,' is particularly pertinent to our responsibility and power over voir dire. He states
that "[in]either logic nor history nor the intent of the draftsmen of the
Fourteenth Amendment can possibly be said to require that the Sixth
Amendment or its jury trial provision be applied to the States together
with the total gloss that this Court's decisions have supplied.... [The
Due Process Clause] does not command us rigidly and arbitrarily to
4 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957).
5

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); see Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
6 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
7
Id. at 149.
8391 U.S. 194 (1968).
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impose the exact pattern of federal proceedings upon the 50 States." 9
The court of appeals quotes this very language in stating that federal
interference with the details of state procedure in jury trials was unwarranted except in matters of the most vital and serious import.
We cannot, however, abjure the responsibility we assumed in
Witherspoon v. Illinois," to regulate the methods of voir dire insofar
as they impinge upon the constitutional guarantees. To disregard the
methods by which the jury was selected and the type of personnel who
are entitled to sit thereon would render meaningless our guarantee of
a jury trial.
The import of our decision in Witherspoon is of the widest possible
application. It commands precisely the opposite conclusion to that
reached by the court of appeals that we should interfere solely in
matters of the most substantial nature. It means that in order to discharge our responsibility, we must closely examine all methods of
jury selection, including that of voir dire, to be certain that they meet
the requirements established by the Constitution.
The true basis of the denial of relief by the court of appeals is
its holding that the right to impanel an impartial jury overrode whatever right to privacy the petitioner may have possessed except, of
course, his right to avoid self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Implicit in the decision of the court of appeals are the assumptions that a fair trial is impossible without (1) the use of the voir dire
in general, and (2) the employment of an extended voir dire in the
situation here presented.
It is interesting to note that the extensive use of the voir dire as
allowed throughout most of the United States has been throughout
history and is now practically unique among all common law jurisdictions. In England and Canada, for instance, no voir dire at all has
ever been allowed except where a particularized challenge for cause
has been levelled against a specific juror." The English practice was
general throughout this country at the time our Constitution and its
Bill of Rights were approved.' 2 The right to jury trial as constitutionally
guaranteed did not, therefore, include the right to voir dire except as
strictly limited under the English practice." We must, however, inquire
as to whether the widespread adoption of extended voir dire since its
inception in the early 19th century has in effect enshrined it as one of
the essential guarantees of our governmental system.
9 Id. at 213, 214 (concurring opinion).
10 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
1 MILLAR,

CIVIL PROCEDURES OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

(1952).
121id. at 292.
13 MILLAR, Supra nOte 11.

289-92
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Even a cursory inspection of the countless cases interpreting the
scope of voir dire and the questions which may or may not be asked
reveals an utterly unmanageable diversity. 4 Neither a constitutional
guarantee nor a right essential to free men can be erected from a
meaningless assemblage of discordant cases. Obviously, voir dire is
merely one of the various procedural methods used or which might
be used to attain the ineluctable requirement of an impartial jury. It is
subject to modification and even to elimination as the dictates of
efficiency and justice require. It is our responsibility under our holdings
in Duncan, Bloom, and Witherspoon to determine what, if anything,
should be done in this regard, not only so far as the federal judicial
system is concerned, but also as to all the state courts throughout the
nation.
Undoubtedly, interference on our part with voir dire will generate
the accusation that a power-hungry urge has induced us to replace the
empirical flexibility of nisi prius judges with an iron rule imposed
from an ivory tower. We are considering this action, however, solely
to ensure that the universal right to jury trial granted by Duncan not
be impaired.
It has long been the policy of Congress and this Court that "all
litigants . . . shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at
random from a fair cross-section of the community ... that all citizens
shall have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and
petit juries ... .16
Voir dire must operate within the framework of this basic purpose.
It must not be used to render nugatory all of the other selection procedures which have been meticulously devised to ensure that the panel
be, so far as possible, a microcosm of the community. As de Tocqueville
stated long ago, the American jury is not solely a judicial institution,
"for, however great its influence may be upon ... the courts, it is still
greater on the destinies of society .... The jury is, above all, a political
institution, and it must be regarded in this light in order to be duly
appreciated. . . . The institution of the jury . . . invests the people
. . . with the direction of society. . . . It imbues all classes with a
respect for the thing judged and with the notion of right .... It makes
them all feel the duties which they are bound to discharge towards
6
society, and the part which they take in its government.'1
De Tocqueville's tribute to the jury establishes the rationale for
Duncan, Bloom, and Witherspoon. Moreover, his argument justifies
the limitation which we now impose that voir dire must not distort the
14 1 BOSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS 503

et seq.

(1959);

1 GOLDSTEIN & LANE,

TRIAL TECHNIQUE (2d ed. 1969); 4 A.L.R. 2d 761 (1949); 54 A.L.R. 2d 1204 (1957);

72 A.L.R. 2d905 (1960); 67 A.L.R. 2d 560 (1959).
1528 U.S.C. § 1861, as amended March 27, 1968, Pub. L. 90-274, 82 Stat. 54.
'ODE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 127-28 (New American Library ed. 1956).
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achievements in panel selection accomplished through the projects of
the American Bar Association 1 7 and required by the Jury Selection
and Service Act of 1968.18
We appreciate, as noted by Mr. Justice White in Swain v.
Alabama,'" that "[t]he persistence of peremptories and their extensive
use [in the United StatesJ demonstrate the long and widely held
belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury."2
We, therefore, do not at this time see any necessity for the elimination
of peremptory challenges, as such, except where proof can be educed
of a state's systematic use of this procedure to eliminate jurors of a
certain race or class. We cannot, however, ignore the fact that "voir
dire in American trials tends to be extensive and probing . . .and the
process of selecting a jury protracted" because the questioning is used
as "a predicate for the exercise of peremptories.'
Many devastating attacks have been mounted against voir dire.
The average trial manual bows in passing to the use of voir dire in
obtaining a jury that is fair to both sides. Then it emphasizes that its
greatest use is, in the words of the notorious Irish comic, Mr. Dooley,
to get a jury that is "more fair to one side than the other. ' 2 2 Much of
what purports to be serious literature on voir dire would be hilarious,
except that it indicates the depths to which the pursuit of victory
can descend.
The purpose of voir dire is to eliminate bias, not to create rapport
nor to discover its impossibility. The denial of the right to question in
order to establish grounds for a peremptory will go far, not only to
expedite voir dire and to eliminate most of the abuses described above,
but, what is much more vital, to focus it once again on what it was
created to accomplish. We shall not prohibit peremptory challenges
themselves since the litigants should have an arbitrary right to remove a
limited number of jurors whose appearance, demeanor or background
they dislike. We do, however, forbid inquiry to establish a basis for this
type of challenge.
The jury trial is weakest at its inception. The potential jurors,
having waited aimlessly, perhaps for days, are confronted by a crossexamination which frequently probes into their private concerns. With
little explanation, they are either found wanting or are precipitated into
a proceeding in which the connection of one episode with another is
often difficult to perceive. Their precise relationship to what is trans17

ABA

PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING

(Approved Draft, 1968).
§ 1961 et seq.
19 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
TO TRIAL BY JURY

18 28 U.S.C.

Id. at 219.
Id. at 218, 219.
2Dunne, Mr. Dooley on Criminal Trials, in
20

21

PROSSER, THE JUDICIAL HUMORIST (1952).
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piring is never explained until at the end the judge instructs them as to
their function. By then, a major portion of what they are to do is
already behind them: to listen intelligently to the evidence from the
standpoint of the duty they are to perform. No judge worthy to sit
upon the bench would deign to listen to a case unless, at the outset,
he knew the questions involved, the contentions of the parties, and
what his powers and responsibilities were in relation to the issues
before him, true he would not be expected to know every detail, but
his general knowledge should be of sufficient scope to ensure his
comprehension as the trial unfolded.
The juror is a partner in the judging process. As we have previously explained, such partnership is essential in these parlous times.
Is it fair to the juror or the litigant, is it sensible to expect the juror
to participate in adjudication without possessing at the outset the same
general knowledge that a judge should have? Obviously, the juror can
have neither the educational background nor the professional experience of the jurist. But should we impose upon him the frustrating
task of sailing a ship when he knows not the peculiarities of the vessel
nor the methods by which he is to navigate? The answer to the questions
propounded must obviously be "no."
Initially, the members of the jury panel should be instructed as
intensively as possible as to the jury's function in relation to the specific
case to be heard. The burdens of proof which must be sustained, the
relationship of the law to the facts to be elicited, the prejudices which
may be created in the story to be unfolded or in the identities of the
parties and witnesses should be emphasized at once. To summarize, the
judge should instruct the jurors at the start, just as the participants in
any other human project are briefed before they enter upon their tasks.
Vagaries may occur en route requiring alteration of the instructions,
but this would pose little problem. With the wide use of pretrial discovery now in vogue, the likelihood of substantial changes would be
small.
Voir dire should be so coordinated with the instructions that it
flows naturally therefrom and complements their meaning. Potential
jurors, as part of their education in the problems they will meet
throughout the trial, will be answering questions related logically to
the instructions in an ambience of mutual trust and with a consciousness
that they are cooperating members of the judicial team. They will be
much more likely to probe intelligently the inner depths of thought
and feeling and determine sincerely whether they are qualified to
judge impartially. The first impressions, rated so important by the trial
manuals, will be imparted by an even-handed judge rather than by
caviling attorneys seeking personal advantage.
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There is no doubt that this will impose additional duties on
already burdened judges. We believe that this additional burden is
required if jury trials are to survive and possess the significance they
must have for all our citizens, dissident or not. The judges' burden
may be lightened by the preparation of general outline instructions and
accompanying specimen voir dires, adaptable to the various types of
litigation coming before the courts. We shall see to the appointment
of outstanding committees of federal and state trial judges and members of the Bar for this purpose.
The extent of the preliminary instructions and the accompanying
voir dire must be established in each case by pretrial procedures similar
to those now used for discovery. We do not at this time determine
precisely how these procedures will operate since it will require the
promulgation of additional rules after proper detailed study. Once
proper general forms are prepared, it may be a relatively simple procedure.
Perhaps a pretrial conference should be held, at which the lawyers
and the judge, using the forms as a guide, would determine the scope of
the instructions and voir dire, the same to be incorporated in a pretrial order.
Perhaps the rules should provide that the scope established by the
forms will govern at the trial unless prior thereto one of the lawyers
serves upon his opponents specific and detailed proposals for alterations or additions. Whether these proposals are opposed or not, the
petitioning attorney must establish their necessity and propriety to
the satisfaction of the trial court, which shall enter a pretrial order
explaining the reasons for any deviations. Either method, or others
which may be devised, will eliminate the present haphazard groping
before the panel, which results in loss of public respect and unconscionable delay.
Above all, the procedures should be developed so that this preliminary function becomes one of the most essential duties of the
judge. The opening of the trial must become a vital educational experience for the panel.
The questions, their scope determined before the trial, must be
propounded solely by the judge, be limited to establishing grounds to
challenge for cause, and this cause limited strictly to contemporaneous
and direct prejudice concerning the case itself, the parties, witnesses or
counsel. Questions calculated to discover general opinions, beliefs,
associations and experience of the juror must be disallowed. Inquiry to
determine whether the juror has some knowledge of the issue or some
thought in relation thereto must be forbidden unless directed specifically to events, persons or organizations involved in the trial or
incidents leading thereto. As Chief Justice Marshall said in the trial
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of Aaron Burr: "To say that any man who had formed an opinion
on any fact conducive to the final decision.., would.., be disqualified ...would exclude intelligent and observing men.' '28 To permit
such questions is to transform the jury from a representative crosssection into an instrument favoring the philosophy of the examining
advocate or the judge himself.
We have already discussed the inadequacy of voir dire in cases
of prejudicial publicity. There, after a brief explanation, tile court
should inquire as to whether any juror has read, witnessed or has
significant knowledge of the objectionable publicity. If so, he should
be excused. If this publicity has been widely disseminated throughout
the community, other methods than voir dire must be employed, as,
for instance, change of venue, empaneling jurors from another area
or postponement.
Obviously, the voir dire of the petitioner was too broad. Although
our ruling is not to be effective retroactively to other cases, we have
no choice but to reverse and remand with instructions to the district
court to order the conviction and sentence set aside.
It is so ordered.
THE DISCUSSION

journal:
At the outset of this discussion, the Journal would first
like to extend its appreciation to each of you for taking the time to
engage in this project and, second, would like to set forth in general
terms the tenor of the conversation which is to follow. The Journal
hopes that each of you will try to direct your comments to the history,
scope, and purpose of voir dire; the abuses that exist within that
practice; some of the steps that have been taken to correct those abuses
by the Federal Rules and the ABA STANDARDS; and the suggestions
that Mr. Maxwell developed in his essay. Perhaps Mr. Erickson would
like to begin the discussion.
ERICKSON:
Initially, I would like to address myself to abuses
of voir dire and the effect of Rule 24(a) .24 Specifically, the federal
court system with Rule 24 (a) certainly has shortened the voir dire process in most instances. The only place that I find the Federal Rule lacking
is when the federal judge permits no additional questions or any
voir dire of any kind by opposing counsel. Even when the trial judge
restricts traditional voir dire, if he allows meaningful questions for
the purpose of exercising the voir dire in accordance with the new
standards relating to trial by jury (to determine whether grounds exist
23 1 ROBERTSON, REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON BURR

& Earle, Philadelphia, 1808).
24 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).

414 et seq. (Hopkins
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for a challenge for cause or for meaningful exercise of a peremptory
challenge) I think that the Federal Rule is quite desirable and that
the standards spell out a means. I do, however, think that Mr. Maxwell's suggestion that a pretrial conference be held to spell out the
zone of inquiry is a worthwhile suggestion.
I was very much impressed with Mr. Maxwell's article.
CRAIG:
I might say that for some time our [federal] courts have been following the practice under 24(a) and limit the voir dire to examination
by the judge. We have inadvertently incorporated to some degree Mr.
Maxwell's thought about pretrial on the subject of voir dire, but we
don't call it that. What we do is notify counsel that if they have any
areas that they would like to have covered in voir dire, the court will
go over them and cover them in the court's words if the court believes
they are pertinent to the voir dire inquiry and if counsel will submit
them before the case is called.
I think that Mr. Maxwell points out very well in his article that
the purpose of voir dire is simply to secure a fair and impartial panel.
It's not for the purpose of opening a rapport between counsel and
some prospective juror, although I know that in many instances it has
been used for that purpose; and I think that Mr. Maxwell's quote from
our friend Dooley25 was a very pertinent one, illustrating the situation
in which counsel tries to become friendly with the jury and be the
fair-haired boy. I think this practice should be restricted - as far as
rapport is concerned -to counsel's opening statement. I know that
Bill Erickson and I have sat on panels and have heard both sides of
that issue - whether, for example, defense counsel should make an
opening statement subsequent to the choosing of the jury. That's
another subject. But I think that is counsel's opportunity to at least
sell himself to the jury in representing his client. There are some
that disagree with that view, but I think it can be used appropriately
in the trial process. But on voir dire, I think abuses have crept in.
FRIESEN:
I think, like my friends, that the essay is quite scholarly
and proposes a solution which should be adopted almost universally.
But to say that it should be adopted is a long way from getting the
people who are interested in these kinds of problems to adopt them.
The article really avoids the issue by assuming that the purpose of the
voir dire is to get an impartial jury. There is a substantial amount of
opinion and a substantial number of lawyers and judges who still
subscribe to the view that the adversary process requires each lawyer
to have an opportunity to assess the psyche, if you like, of the jurors
and to develop rapport with them. We can all assume -I think the
25

Dunne, supra note 22.
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four of us do- that that is not the purpose of voir dire. But I had
hoped that we might talk about this more crucial and fundamental
issue as a part of this discussion.
ERICKSON:
I know that I heard one old lawyer say, "As soon as
I finish with the voir dire, it's time for the jury to retire and reach
their verdict."
CRAIG:
[Laughter] I would hesitate to implement the philosophy
or return to the original philosophy of voir dire examinations by
creating too many rules. I think the Federal Rule is adequate the way
it is. I think that what we really need is a little more education of the
profession - maybe even through the law schools - as to the function
of voir dire and how it should be conducted. Then the bar can take
care of itself without having too many rules. What I am concerned
with is that if you develop a body of rules directed to voir dire, then
pretty soon some court is going to come along and say, "well, in this
case somebody failed to dot the 'i' on this particular segment of the
rule; therefore, it is reversible error, and we'll send it back for a new
trial." You get bogged down in the rule process instead of going back
to the purpose of it, i.e., was the jury drawn as a result of that voir dire
examination, so far as we can determine, a fair and impartial one? I
think Ernie Friesen's emphasis in that area is absolutely right.
ERICKSON:
Of course, the well-publicized trial is one that the
federal courts have a difficult time coping with because of the manner
used to determine jury eligibility. The question whether or not a
challenge is going to be exercised, either peremptorily or for cause,
once you have a widely publicized case doesn't come to the forefront
as quickly as it does in state court practice where a wide-open voir dire
is permitted. It is often very difficult when a juror has been bombarded
with publicity for a period of six months to ask one question that will
go into the depth of his knowledge or the depth of his feelings about
a particular case. When you read the case of Sheppard v. Maxwell,"'
you can see that the panel was actually brainwashed; and then you look
at the Rideau 7 case and you see that it was impossible to effectively
select a jury after the televised confession of these rather atrocious
murders in Louisiana.
CRAIG:
Of course I think a significant portion of the problem
in the Sheppard case, and in some of the others, results from the willingness of the trial judge to allow counsel to explore every avenue
willynilly, whether it is meritorious or not, on the primary function
of fair and impartial juror selection. What is really required in those
2

6 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).

27

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 47

circumstances is a little tighter rein from the bench; possibly a formal
pretrial conference in that type of situation would be advisable. While
I would not recommend such practice in every case, I think that in a
case like Sheppard it might be helpful. I am firmly of the belief that
it is ridiculous to take two or three weeks or longer to get a jury, and
I don't care what kind of a case it is. In six years on the bench, I've
experienced some pretty well-publicized cases and some pretty hoary
ones, and I have yet to spend over an hour and a half selecting a jury.
FRIESEN:
I think Judge Craig has hit on the note that I would
emphasize and that is that we should not limit the discretion of the
judge by further imposing rules to try to control the problem of voir
dire. The image of the judge as a "patsy referee" is dying, I hope, and
the position of the judge as an active manager of the trial is the
emerging view. We should hopefully inculcate in lawyers and thereby
in judges what the purpose of voir dire is and emphasize that in the
exercise of sound discretion the judge should be able to rule out all
sorts of questions that go into areas that Mr. Maxwell would exclude.
But I think I agree with Judge Craig; this change in voir dire should
be left to judicial development and training and not to rules.
CRAIG:
Another practice affecting voir dire that exists in federal
courts and in many state courts involves the selection of the panel from
the master wheel. Once the proposed candidates are drawn from the
wheel they receive a questionnaire. The questionnaire is a pretty
thorough one with respect to age, health, place of birth, residence, occupation, family, children, etc. Our counsel have become educated to
the fact that they can come into court the day before trial - sometimes
sooner - and examine that list of questionnaires. In addition, when
a panel reports for duty in any given courtroom, the clerk has available
those same questionnaires; and counsel, while the court is drawing the
panel, can be going through the answers to see just who the people are.
If counsel has been on the ball, he knows just where the people came
from, how long they've been there, how many children they have, what
their occupation is, and all the rest of it. Thus, he can know pretty
well who he has before the voir dire interrogation begins.
ERICKSON:
I think every trial lawyer wants primarily to have a
basis on which he can intelligently exercise a peremptory challenge.
However, if the voir dire is conducted by the court and covers only very
restricted matters, the peremptory challenges can only be exercised
indiscriminately; this often happens when an overzealous trial judge
is involved.
CRAIG:
In my opinion, the trial judge should make a pretty complete voir dire examination; but when I say complete, I don't mean he
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should go into what the fellow had for breakfast and what his ideological fancies may or may not have been. I have 23 general questions
in my standard criminal case voir dire which are supplemented by
questions relating to the specific crime charged. For example, if it is
a Dyer Act case,2 I ask anyone on the panel if they ever had a car
stolen; if it was returned and, if so, in what kind of condition; and
whether the fact that they had a car stolen would affect their judgment
in this case. So one can make succinct inquiries in each case without
delving into a person's religious background or philosophy or what
their mother taught them when they were six years old.
ERICKSON:
I have no objection to that, but I had occasion to be
called upon in federal court to exercise peremptory challenge after
some 15 to 20 questions were asked. That hardly gives one an indication
of anything. As a matter of fact, I was once called upon to exercise
peremptory challenges in the federal court after some 10 or 12 questions
were asked; I was told to exercise challenges for cause and then peremptory challenges. I stood and I said, "If the court please, will the
court ask Question No. 38 ?" (I'd turned in a series of questions.) The
presiding judge said, "I've covered it." I replied, "Did you ask
Question No. 12?" He said, "Covered it." So finally I said, "Your
Honor, would you ask Juror No. 6 if she has any difficulty hearing?"
Whereupon he said, "I'll ask that," and said, "Mrs. Smith, do you have
any difficulty hearing?" She looked at him and she said, "Not as a
rule, Your Honor, but in your case I haven't heard a word you said,
you mumble so much." After that statement the judge said, "I'll honor
a challenge for cause."
CRAIG:
[Laughter] Well, I guess those kinds of situations Erickson describes can be repeated many times. I think Ernie Friesen put his
finger on it pretty well: You have to educate the judges as well as the
lawyers. I don't think that's an impossible task. I think they are
generally receptive to recommendations and good viable criticism.
MAXWELL:
Wouldn't this be an area in which something along
the line of a pretrial conference going into what the general questions
are to be in the voir dire might help? If such a device were employed,
the extent of the voir dire could be wrangled out before trial and,
at trial, the problem of whether or not enough questions were asked
would not exist. In other words, if there were some list of questions
which were going to be asked by the judge in the particular case, the
attorneys would have had the opportunity prior to the trial to suggest
other questions. This would have been determined before the trial
rather than at the trial itself. Wouldn't Mr. Erickson's story indicate
2

8 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964).
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that sometimes something more should be done prior to the trial rather
than at the trial?
CRAIG:
As I said earlier, I think that is true in certain cases. I
guess it doesn't make much difference in violations of the law except
when the punishment is capital punishment. You can get a lot of
inflammatory facts arising out of the circumstances that brought about
the charge. But what one is confronted with in cases like Sheppard,
Sirhan, and others is not the facts and circumstances nor the qualifications of the average juror that comes in off the street; the real
problem is the effect of the publicity. As has been pointed out by the
Supreme Court and others, in some circumstances there is no way to
get a fair trial at a particular moment and in a particular locality
because the public in the locality has been so inflamed by the media
that their minds are made up. In those cases I think, as that Court has
suggested, that two things can be used: delay to dull the public's
memory or change of venue where the publicity is limited to a relatively
reasonable area.
MAXWELL:
In the well-publicized type of case, the actual fact is
that voir dire really becomes useless. You can't do much with it if
that type of publicity has been widespread in a particular community.
CRAIG:
That is true, but after you remove or delay, the voir dire
assumes its place again. All I contend is that it is not necessary to have
a pretrial on voir dire in every criminal action.
MAXWELL:
I do not necessarily disagree. I think, however, that
the idea suggested by Mr. Friesen of educating the bar and state and
federal judges, as to the adversary process is a very long process; it
certainly cannot be coordinated very well throughout the country. The
thrust of my article, more or less, is not to advocate any particular
course of action but to attempt to call the attention of the bar and the
readers of the article to the fact that the situation is pretty critical at
this time in certain trials; that in certain states and areas where extended voir dire does occur, it somewhat damages the image of the
processes of justice; and that the situation is such that unless pretty
prompt action is taken generally to overcome this situation, there is a
risk that there will be doctrinaire and strict rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court or some central fountainhead.
This kind of approach may or may not be desirable, but I think the
educational process is perhaps too long. Something has to be done as
to the adversary process generally -and this is only one facet of it
- to bring trials and the court procedures within some general control
so that the processes of justice are expedited and still remain fair.
This process relates not only to voir dire but to many other elements of
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the trial. We are coming to the position in many courts where the
calendars are so delayed that something has to be done generally to
the trial processes. As Chief Justice Burger indicated, much of this
delay is caused by a horse-and-buggy-age approach to problems when
we have rocket ships on the moon. The whole trial system has to be
closely investigated, and there have to be some new rules and processes
developed almost immediately to handle these trials before the situation
gets more out of hand than it already is in many courts.
CRAIG:
I agree with the major part of what you have just said
except that I think the suggestion for an educational process is a
sound one.
MAXWELL:
I agree, but I am of the opinion that something
more direct and more positive has to be done now in cooperation with
the educational process.
CRAIG:
I think we have already started to develop some new approaches, such as the new Federal Rules.
MAXWELL:

I agree, but it is only a start.

FRIESEN:
I don't really think you can handle the whole problem
of voir dire with new rules. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were new in 1938 and actually became effective in 1939. Yet if one
reads cases that were published in 1949 (and some as late as 1955), he
finds that the spirit of the rules was not in effect. It took an educational
process of judges and lawyers and an interaction of the two to get
anything done.
Rules alone don't accomplish this educative task because, as I
said earlier, I think rules tend to gloss over the fundamental problem.
Look at Mr. Maxwell's article for example; he says we should not prohibit peremptory challenges themselves, since the litigants should have
an arbitrary right to remove a limited number of jurors whose appearance, demeanor or background they dislike. We do, however, forbid inquiry to establish a basis for this type of challenge. Are you saying, Mr.
Maxwell, that we should allow counsel to exercise peremptories because
they don't like the way jurors smile or wear their hair and that we
should also permit them to exercise peremptories without any regard
to what these jurors think?
MAXWELL:
Well, basically, in a state like Pennsylvania, we have
a questionnaire that is similar to the one that was mentioned before. The
voir dire is extremely limited in Pennsylvania, and in most cases except in a capital case where there would be an extended voir dire
at some times - the peremptory challenge is pretty well based on the
items that Mr. Friesen mentioned. In Pennsylvania the peremptory
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challenge really depends on the feeling of the lawyer for the party.
I think that if the questioning develops things of the nature we are
talking about and if there is some serious situation, then a challenge
for cause would lie; but a peremptory challenge, in my opinion,
depends largely on the idiosyncrasy, the whim, or the hunch of the
lawyer. I think this is true no matter how long questions are asked.
ERICKSON:
Don't you think it is true, Mr. Maxwell, that the
challenges for cause, even under the new STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE relating to TRIAL BY JURY, 29 are very restrictive? And isn't
it nearly impossible to bring a challenge within the cause requirements
of most statutes? If so, your only basis in selecting a jury is to intelligently exercise your peremptory challenges; and if you limit the areas
of questioning that trial counsel is going to use, the defendant is going
to be deprived of the effective use of counsel.
I think that it is for the experienced advocate to determine what
use is going to be made of certain material; the trial judge is not in
many instances prepared to know just exactly what concerns trial
counsel, particularly in cases which receive wide publicity, such as
some heinous sex offense. In cases involving public officials, questions
that look wholly innocuous on their face may have really deep significance.
MAXWELL:
I think the difficulty you present goes to the question
of the extensiveness of voir dire and to the place of an extensive
voir dire in reference to the breakdown in many of the jurisdictionsthe populous jurisdictions - of the processes of justice and of the
expedition of justice. This is very serious in places like Philadelphia,
New York and Boston. Something must be done to expedite and still
be fair. When you argue against the limitation on the areas of questioning you have opened the door wide to the type of abuses that voir dire
is capable of allowing. Once you doubt that the trial judge understands
the significance of certain questions that counsel wants to ask and that
counsel cannot convince the court that a challenge for cause is warranted, I think at that point you have destroyed the entire desire to
change or simplify voir dire. I don't think you can do that.
In regard to the statement by Mr. Friesen about the Federal Rules,
it is unquestionable that -except in very progressive courts such as
2 ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING

To TRIAL BY JURY § 2.5 Challenges for Cause (Approved Draft, 1968):
If the judge after examination of any juror is of the opinion that grounds for
challenge for cause are present, the judge should excuse that juror from the
trial of the case. If the judge does not excuse the juror, any party may challenge
the juror for cause. A challenge to an individual juror should be made before he
is sworn to try the case, but the judge may permit it to be made after he is
sworn but before jeopardy has attached.
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the Eastern District of Pennsylvania - after the promulgation of the
original Federal Rules, it took a long time before such a procedure as
discovery really came into the prominence that it enjoys today. It is
true that it took a long educational process; but my point is this: The
educational process is fine, but would the educational process have
developed if the new Rules had not actually been put in? Without the
new Federal Rules the educational process would not have taken the
line it did and would have accomplished nothing along the lines that
have been established. The two (educational process and rules) must
work together; and without the certain promulgation of new rules,
not only as to voir dire but as to other procedures, the educational
process cannot succeed. I think they must walk together as they did in
the promulgation of new Federal Rules 20 or 30 years ago.
Don't the Federal Rules make voir dire discretionary
ERICKSON:
with the trial judge?
What I am getting at is that a great deal of this
MAXWELL:
discretion as to length and so on must be dispensed with in many
procedures today because our courts are so bogged down. There are
too many differences between the judges, one judge doing one thing
and in the next courtroom another judge is doing another; it varies
from district to district, especially in the populous states. I think for
example, that courts in Delaware County in Philadelphia may vary
significantly on all types of procedures. This cannot go on. There has
to be discretion to a certain extent, of course; but I think that because
of the mounting crisis in courts in these populous places, something
has to be done to make things uniform and progressive. I am not talking about a Hitlerian dictatorship and I am not saying remove all discretion, but I think there have to be strong guidelines.
Wally [Craig], have you ever known a federal judge
ERICKSON:
to abuse his voir dire by extending it beyond reason?
CRAIG:
No, I can't say that I have; but I think what you and Mr.
Maxwell are referring to is the reverse of that. If a federal judge cuts
it too short, that is not good either. Again, it takes educational programs
like seminars of judges to go into these problems. In the 9th Circuit
there is now a Federal District Judges' Association which is undertaking to put on seminars for the judges on procedures and methods
of operations that will move the calendar more rapidly. Ernie [Friesen]
was formerly Dean of the National College of State Trial Judges, and
they are conducting programs which can accomplish the same thing
with state judges. These are all very good. What I am afraid of is that

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 47

if we start promulgating rules without giving the educational process
an opportunity we will hurt the system rather than help it. What has
happened with our great "new" Rules under the federal system which
Arizona adopted in 1939 as part of the state system (and we were
warned about this back in the days when they were discussing adoption
of the new Rules and in the discovery process particularly) is that
abuses have crept in and delayed rather than expedited litigation. This
happens and has been happening in our jurisdiction; boiler-plate interrogatories are a good example of this problem.
MAXWELL:
I agree. These boiler-plate interrogatories are not
strategically valuable in most cases. I think they are ridiculous, and
this type of practice is an abuse of the Rules. Obviously, no matter
what type of rules you put in, you are going to have abuses.
I certainly do not advocate prompt and immediate enactment of
a group of rules. I think the article indicates the promulgation of new
rules could only be done after thorough study; a lot of these studies are
going on at the present time. The article merely attempts to light up in
one small area of our trial procedure the crisis that exists and attempts
to show that there must be an educational process. There must be continuing thought given to revision of rules and to more ways in which
the trial process can be modernized. Much of what is said in the article
and much of what we have been talking about really relates to the abuses
of the adversary system that work into voir dire and make the process
seem ridiculous. The Judge [Craig] said that much of the solution to
these problems depends upon the rein a judge keeps on the lawyers - of
course there are tyrannical judges who keep too much of a rein; but
I don't think that this means that you should not seriously consider the
enactment and promulgation of new rules and also the investment of
the judge with the power to really control the trial.
FRIESEN:
If the whole argument for rules to limit voir dire is
based upon the congestion and delay in the courts, it is a specious argument. By reducing voir dire to one-tenth of what it now is, we would
not increase the judge power of the United States by one percent. There
is misapprehension of the amount of time that judges spend in that
process.
We might also want to look at other solutions. For example, a
practice which has existed in New York and in parts of Pennsylvania
for a number of years allows the jury to be selected outside of the
hearing of the judge. Despite all the cries of anguish which have come
from outsiders who have never experienced it, it works rather well and
does not consume a lot of the lawyers' time. Los Angeles is now running
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an experiment on this procedure, and its documentation indicates,
or seems to indicate, that it is going to be effective.
I would, however, like to leave that comment on a more positive
note. I think Mr. Maxwell's suggestion that we work diligently at
educating juries about their role and explaining to them what the case
is about- connecting it with the instructions which they are going
to get with the case - is a very good one and something that we should
follow and work at as some judges have. Judge Grimes in New Hampshire has for years given a half day indoctrination to a new jury panel;
he carefully explains these things just as Mr. Maxwell suggests. These
practices should certainly be emulated.
CRAIG:
I don't take a half day; but after the full panel is qualified,
I take from half an hour to 45 minutes. With every new panel we give
sort of an eighth grade civics lesson on how the court works and what
the functions are of the various parties to the trial; we read the indictment and the statute upon which the indictment is based, explain the
burden of proof and why the government opens and closes as distinguished from having rebuttal from both sides. It's a little difficult because you don't want to assume total ignorance; they've heard it someplace in their educational process. They know generally what it is about;
but I get down to the nitty-gritty specifics as to what their function is and
as to what the functions of the various counsel are. I can do it within
30 to 45 minutes on a full panel. Then, with each case - whether they
have heard it before or not -I spend about 10 minutes with them
reviewing what their function is and what we are doing there. So I
think we are attempting, in my court at least, to carry out some of the
meritorious recommendations that were contained in Mr. Maxwell's
article.
I have had no objections from counsel or anybody else on that
approach to the problem, nor really have I had any objection to the
limitation on voir dire. As I said before, however, on the more difficult
cases - the ones that have had local publicity to some extent - I go
a little further on voir dire than I ordinarily would and am a little
more lenient with counsel on the questions they want to ask. But I
still hold it down; I don't let them go like they do in Los Angeles. I
have sat in Los Angeles, and I don't think Sirhan would have taken
as much time in a federal court even in Los Angeles.
ERICKSON:

Mr. Maxwell, do you have any quarrel with the new
relating to TRIAL BY JURY,8 0 particularly the voir dire examination concepts as they are set forth in
STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

30 ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO TRIAL BY JURY (Approved Draft, 1968).
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Sections 2.41 and 2.5" on challenges for cause and the method under
which the voir dire is carried out? It is really just an overgrowth of
Rule 24a of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
MAXWELL:
I think basically that the Federal Rules are satisfactory. Along the lines of the article, however, I would suggest certain
refinements and explanations. In particular, the principle points of the
case should be explained to the jury so that they will have a much
better picture of what they are going to be listening to. With certain
modifications, as outlined in the article, I would not seriously argue
with the Federal Rules.
Your question, Mr. Erickson, seems to also have reference to
what Mr. Friesen said a moment ago about the procedure in the State
of New York where the voir dire is held outside of the hearing of the
judge. I understand that this form of voir dire becomes extremely
extended, even in automobile accident cases, because counsel ask practically everything under the sun that has any remote relation to their
case. Consequently, I don't think this method will solve this problem
in federal courts. In metropolitan areas like New York City, there is
a serious problem not only with voir dire but with other dilatory procedures. These procedures make a show out of a trial, and I think
that's the gravamen of the article.
ERICKSON:
Judge Craig, how do you read Williams v. Florida?"B
What size jury should we use? To save time, should we cut the jury
down from 12 to six; should we say, for example, that in Dyer Act
cases we will have six jurors and that in misdemeanor cases we will have
a jury of three; but in cases involving capital punishment we will have a
jury of 12? Just where do we draw the line?
CRAIG:
I don't think you have to lessen the size of the jury. We
have been been working under the 12-man system for a few centuries
slId. § 2.4 Voir Dire Examination:
A voir dire examination should be conducted for the purpose of discovering
basis for challenge for cause and for the purpose of gaining knowledge to enable
an intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. The judge should initiate the
voir dire examination by identifying the parties and their respective counsel
and by briefly outlining the nature of the case. The judge should then put to
the prospective jurors any questions which he thinks necessary, touching their
qualifications to serve as jurors in the cause on trial. The judge should also
submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions by the defendant or
his attorney and the prosecuting attorney as he deems proper.
3 Id. § 2.5 Challenges for Cause:
If the judge after examination of any juror is of the opinion that grounds for
challenge for cause are present, the judge should excuse that juror from the
trial of the case. If the judge does not excuse the juror, any party may challenge
the juror for cause. A challenge to an individual juror should be made before
he is sworn to try the case, but the judge may permit it to be made after he is
sworn but before jeopardy has attached.
33 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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now, and I think it has worked out pretty well. When I was engaged
in private practice, I must confess that I had some question in my
mind about the value of the jury system. The old adage was that if
you were guilty you would want to be tried by a jury, but if you were
innocent you would want to be tried by a judge. My faith, having sat
on the bench of 6 years now, has been thoroughly renewed in the
jury system. In those 6 years, in only two instances did the jury, in
my opinion, make a mistake; and on both occasions I took the decision
away from them and corrected it. Maybe I was wrong, I don't know;
but we'll never know because I found for the defendant in both instances. I think the system under the Constitution and the practice that
we have had is a very good one. I see nothing wrong with a 12-man
jury, and I would not differentiate between one charge and another.
Any felony charged is a felony, and a fellow's liberty, and sometimes
his life, is at stake.
ERICKSON:
I concur with you, Judge. A 12-man jury system is a
thing of historical signficance; but in addition, it has proven its worth
with the passage of time. I don't think the Williams case is going to
dictate that every legislature change the number of jurors to be used
in any particular case. I know the people that are striving to speed up
justice and think that reducing the number of jurors would reduce the
cost and the time spent in administering justice; but I think it is a
false premise. Basically, I think the Federal Rules that stand today,
when implemented by the STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, leave our
judicial system in a satisfactory state and one that can be developed
by new techniques that are employed by the judges under the discretionary powers that they now have.
CRAIG:
I thoroughly agree with that. I would, however, add a
footnote: Today the profession and the public generally are very much
concerned with the selection process of judges. There has been a lot
of comment about removal - that's all right - but I think the emphasis
should be on the selection. Then when you get - I say this with some
temerity - a well-qualified judge, I would hesitate to limit his discretionary prerogative. He's trying to do the job that was assigned to
him, and with the aid of the jury, he's trying to seek the truth within
the limits of the law. If you cut his discretionary authority to any
great extent, his hands are going to be pretty well tied so that when
he sees a situation developing, he can't control it. This would be, in
my opinion, an error in the administration of justice.
I have great faith in our system. Abuses have crept in, particularly
in metropolitan areas, and to some extent they are the result of the
lack of effort used in the selection of the man on the trial bench. These
are not difficult problems to correct. Ernie [Friesen] had experience
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with it, and I think he'll corroborate this approach. If you find a
reasonably alert, intelligent judge on the bench, he can expedite a
trial through the facilities that are presently available to him: the
preliminary pretrial conference; the pretrial conference; and the conference with counsel on voir dire before the trial, and I would hesitate
to make a voir dire, as I said earlier, the subject of a formal pretrial
conference except in extraordinary cases. In the extraordinary case there
certainly is a place for it, but I would hate to put in a blanket rule
that says in all criminal cases involving a penalty of "x," there must
be a pretrial conference on voir dire examination. If this were done
the judge might say, "Well, I don't know about that," and then you
get an opportunity to have error creep in as a result of the pretrial
conference. We're trying to get to a point where we have less error,
not more error. When you get good, viable rules you can proceed on
that process. When you get a body of rules that is difficult for anyone
to interpret, then you're going to have error.
JOURNAL:

Mr. Maxwell, would you make one final statement?

MAXWELL:
I generally agree with what has just been said; the
only difference is really a matter of degree or emphasis. The suggestions in the article are not to tie the judge's hands to any great extent,
but to give him the instruments by which he can proceed and properly
handle the trial using a pretrial procedure, instructing the jury in
advance, and so on. There are certain things that should be promulgated but none of them should to any great extent limit the discretion
of the trial judge. The only disagreement any of us seem to have is
on the question of the degree to which such rules should be promulgated
and how they should be handled. All I'm saying is that trial judges
should be given tools - more powerful tools at this time - to meet
the rising problems that are occurring, particularly in metropolitan
areas.
JOURNAL:
It is rather clear that there are problems with the
practice of voir dire even with the promulgation of the Federal Rules
and the ABA STANDARDS. There are differences of opinion as to the
best way to solve these problems, but, as Mr. Maxwell pointed out,
the differences are more a matter of degree or emphasis than of substance. The choice between relying totally on rules or totally on the
education process would certainly be a difficult one to make, and
either one would not suffer from lack of criticism. The combination
of guidelines and gradual education would seem to be a likely compromise. It must be remembered that Mr. Maxwell's article was based
on a hypothetical Supreme Court decision nearly 10 years in the future.
It is conceivable that if nothing in the way of progress is made in this
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area over the next 10 years, a central "fountainhead" such as the
Supreme Court will decide a case similar to Mr. Maxwell's hypothetical
-a
result that seems unanimously undesirable.
Mr. Freisen made a very interesting point when he discounted
the notion that clearing up of the "voir dire problem" would result in
an unclogging of our courts. While Mr. Maxwell was not basing his
entire argument on this notion, it appears that there is some disagreement over the "clogging factor" of voir dire. If so, it would be well
to find out just how important a factor voir dire really is before it is
labeled as one of the chief culprits in our court congestion problem.
As a final thought, it might be worth mentioning the fact that
the participants as a group did at least recognize that there is a problem
with voir dire. Mr. Freisen did point out that this is not a feeling
shared by all lawyers and judges since some do feel that voir dire
should not be limited to securing an impartial jury but should also
serve the adversary function of allowing an attorney to establish a
rapport with the jurors. That view was not represented in this discussion, but it certainly cannot be discounted in speaking about the
voir dire problem.
This discussion, although not reaching any definitive conclusions,
has raised a number of issues and has presented a number of perspectives and approaches. It is the Journal'shope that this kind of conversation presented in this fashion will be of some benefit to lawmen,
who must contend with voir dire, and to laymen, who must face the
practice when called as jurors, and that the approaches outlined by
the principals will be the focus for further comment as the legal
profession seeks to improve the voir dire process.

